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not indeed, among those who would withdraw from the federal government an iota of the authority which it possesses; we would even
desire to see it more powerful, more respected, more effective than
it is at present. But we are deeply convinced that it must be
strengthened from the centre, and not from the extremities. It is
not by vexatious interference with local improvements and legislation, by the work of simple prohibition and destruction, that the
federal supremacy is to be invigorated and renewed, or wavering
attachments regained. There must be first provided for the States,
a better, higher and more complete system, than those which originate in their independent action; if these indeed be now as jarring
and defective as is alleged. Local legislation over commerce, is to
be displaced only by harmonious and uniform regulation by Congress, which must thus vindicate its power to prohibit, by the fulfilment of its duty to create. The exercise of the federal authority
in this way, however, has been thus far deemed to be injudicious, inexpedient, or unlawful, and the development of the resources, and the
encouragement of the internal commerce of the Union, have been
left entirely to individual and local legislation. Surely, if the discretion of Congress has been thus deliberately employed, it is
neither wise nor equitable for any other branch of the government,
to embarass or interfere with the action of the States, in the honest
completion of the task entrusted, if we ought not rather to say,
abandoned to them.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States, District of Indiana.
November Term, 185.'
WILLIAM JOLLY ET AL. vs. THE TERRE HAUTE DRAW-BRIDGE COMIANY.
1. Under the grant of power to Congress, to regulate commerce among the several
States, as given by the Constitution of the United States, the general government
has jurisdictibn over navigable streams, so far as may be necessary for commercial purposes.
2. A steamboat, enrolled and licensed pursuant to the Act of Congress, is entitled
IThis term was held by Judge Leavitt, of the Ohio District, by the appointment
of Judge McLean, pursuant to the Act of Congress of the 29th July, 1850, in the
place of Judge Huntington, of the Indiana District, who was unable to attend,
owing to sickness in his family.
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to the protection of the general government, while engaged in carrying on commerce between different States; and her owners have a right to use the navigable streams of the country, free from all material obstructions to navigation.
3. In relation to the States carved out of the N. W. Territory, the guaranty in the
ordinance of '87, as to navigable streams, is still in force.
4. The Courts of the Union, having jurisdiction of the parties in a civil suit, are
competent to administer the common law remedy for an injury sustained by reason of an unlawful obstruction in a navigable stream, without any express legislation by Congress, giving the remedy, and prescribing the mode of its enforcement.
5. The national jurisdiction over navigable streams does not deprive the States of
the exercise of such rights over them, as they may deem expedient, subordinate
to the power granted by the Constitution of the United States.
6. A bridge of sufficient elevation, or with a proper draw, is not necessarily an impediment to navigation; neither is any structure or fixture such impediment,
whichfacilitates commerce instead of being a hindrance.
7. The inquiry in this case is, whether the bridge rith the draw erected by the defendant at Terre Haute, is a material obstruction to the navigation of the Wabash
river.
8. If it occasions merely slight stoppages 'and loss of time, unattended with danger
of accident to life or property, it is not such obstruction.
9. The Terre Haute bridge was built under a charter from the State of Indiana,
which required a "1convenient draw" in the bridge. This imports a draw which
can 'be passed without vexatious delay, or risk; and, if not such a one, the charter
is violated; but if it meets the requirement of the act of incorporation, and is yet
a material obstruction, it is a nullity for the want of power in the legislature to
pass such an act.
10. If the jury find the bridge is a material obstruction, but that the injury sustained by the plaintiffs' boat was the result of recklessness, or want of skill in
those having charge of her, the Bridge Company are not liable, and evidence of
the good professional reputation of the pilot will avail nothing, if in this particular case, he was reckless and unskilful.
11. Depositions taken under the Act of Congress, without notice to the opposite
party, are admissible in evidence; but it is for the jury to determine the weight
and credibility to which they are entitled.
12. The evidence of experts, if uncontradicted and unimpeached, is entitled to great
weight.
13. If the jury find for the plaintiffs, they may include in the damages given, the
probable earnings of their boat, for the time she was delayed in repairing the
damages sustained.

0. I.
R.

Smith and S. Yandis, for Plaintiffs.

"W. Thompon and J. P. Usher, for Defendant.
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JUDGE LEAVITT charged the jury, as follows:

This suit is brought by the plaintiffs, as owners of the steamer
American Star, to recover damages sustained by that boat in passing through the draw of the bridge across the Wabash river, at
Terre Haute.
The material facts presented to the jury by the evidence are,
that the Star, a stern-wheel boat, duly enrolled and licensed at the
port of Cincinnati for the coasting trade, with the usual complement of officers and men, under the command of William Jolly as
master, also a part owner, was engaged in the navigation of the
Wabash river, making regular trips for the conveyance of passengers and freight, from Cincinnati to the highest point of navigation on said river; that in March, 1852, the water being at a high
stage, as she was descending the river, in passing through the draw
of the Terre Haute bridge, bow foremost, and partially laden, she
struck with considerable violence against one of the piers of the
bridge, her guards on one side being thereby broken, the top of
the pilot-house carried away, and one of her chimneys thrown down,
with some other minor injuries; that as the result of the collision,
the boat was detained nearly two days at Terre Haute, in making
the necessary temporary repairs, to enable her to prosecute her trip,
and one week at Cincinnati, in making permanent repairs; the actual cost of which is proved to have been $8371; that owing to her
crippled condition after the injury, she was unable to receive freight
offered below Terre Haute, to the amount of some $150 or $200;
and that one entire trip was lost, the usual and estimated profit
of which is stated at 81,000.
The bridge was a wooden structure, with a draw having a space
between the piers of about sixty feet, and at the top of the draw,
when raised, of thirty or forty feet. It was erected by the defendant, under an act of incorporation granted by the legislature of the
State of Indiana, containing a provision requiring the corporators
to construct "a convenient draw" in the bridge.
This brief outline of the case will suffice as preliminary to the
consideration of the questions of law, which have been presented
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and argued with great ability by counsel, and upon which the instructions of the Court have been requested.
It is not controverted by the counsel for the Bridge Company,
that the Wabash is 'a navigable stream; nor is it denied that the
plaintiffs' boat, at the time the alleged injury was sustained, was
employed in carrying on commerce between ports and places lying
in different States. But, it is insisted, that as this bridge was
erected under the authority of the State of Indiana, and in conformity with the charter granted by the State, it cannot be deemed
an obstruction to navigation, in the sense of entitling the plaintiffs
to compensation for the injury complained of..
The Constitution of the United States contains an explicit grant
of power to Congress, to regulate commerce among the several
States. Under this grant, there can be no question of the competency of Congress to exercise jurisdiction over all the navigable
streams, to the extent that may be necessary for the encouragement
and protection of commerce between, or among, two or more States.
This doctrine is so well settled by the uniform legislation of Congress, and the frequent adjudications of' the Supreme Court of the
United States, as to render its discussion here wholly unnecessary.
It is regarded as equally clear that the boat, the owners of which
in this case are seeking compensation for an injury sustained, having been duly enrolled and licensed by the proper officer, in pursuance of an Act of Congress, was rightfully employed in the navigation of the Wabash river, and that her owners, while she was so
employed, have a right to the free use of that river, and were entitled to protection against all unlawful obstructions to its navigation. It follows, that for any injury attributable to such obstructions, the law will give the needful redress. Nor is it necessary for
this purpose, that there should be any express legislation of Congress giving the remedy, and regulating the manner of its enforcement. The Courts of the Union, if the plaintiff is a citizen of a
State other than that in which he brings his suit, have jurisdiction,
and are competent to administer civil remedies for such injuries,
upon the principles of the common law, without any statutory
enactment for that purpose. This doctrine is clearly established by
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the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the
Wheeling Bridge Case. 13 Howard's S. C. Rep. 518.
There is another ground on which the right of every citizen of
the United States to the free and unobstructed navigation of the
Wabash river, may be confidently asserted. The State of Indiana
is one of the States carved out of the North Western Territory,
and therefore subject to the operation of that article of the compact contained in the ordinance of 1787, which declares that "the
navigable waters leading to the Mississippi and the St. Lawrence,
and the carrying-places between the same, shall be common highways," &c. While it is admitted that some of the articles of compact in that ordinance have been superseded by the admission ofthe States within the North Western Territory into the federal
union, it has been held by repeated judicial decisions, that thesolemn guaranty referred to is still in full force, and is a perpetual
inhibition to such States from authorizing any impediments or obstructions to the free navigation of the water courses within its
scope. Siooner vs. .McConnel et al., 1 McLean, 337; Palmer vs.
Commissioners of Cuyahoga County], 3 McLean, 226: .ogg vs.
Zanesville Man. Co., 5 Ohio R. 416.
But, in maintaining the paramount jurisdiction of the national
government over navigable streams, and the operative force of theguaranty in the ordinance of '87 in regard to them, it does not follow that the States are deprived of all power of legislation. Judge,
McLean, in the case above cited from the third volume of his Re-ports, says: "A State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may exercise
certain rights over its navigable waters, subject, however, to the
paramount power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
States. This principle is distinctly recognized in all the cases referred to, whether arising under the commercial power of the general government, or the ordinance of '87. It has never beenclaimed that the States do not rightfully possess jurisdiction upon
and over the navigable water courses within their limits. Such a
claim is clearly in derogation'of the sovereignty of the States, and
therefore, wholly inadmissible. But, while the right of the States
is thus conceded, it is well settled that in the exercise of their ju-
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risdiction, they shall not infringe on that granted to the national
government by the Constitution of the United States; and that in
reference to the States formed from the North Western Territory,
they cannot disregard the provision of the ordinance referred to..
This limitation of the power of the states is not inconsistent with
their claim of sovereignty; nor does it involve necessarily, any
conflict of jurisdiction between them and the government of the
Union. The states have all the power over their water courses, which
is necessary for local or state purposes. The right of a state to
punish crimes commited on its streams, and to authorize and enforce
such-police regulations as may be necessary.for the protection of
her citizens, has never been questioned.' It is equally clear that a
state may adopt such measures, in reference to its water courses, as
are required by its citizens in facilitating trade and commercial
intercourse.
Hence, the states properly exercise the right of
establishing and licensing ferries, and authorizing the construction
of wharves. They may also sanctiou an apparent obstruction of a
navigable stream, by authorizing the erection of dams and locks;
for the obvious reason that these are not hindrances to navigation,
but are promotive of its benefits. Nor can there be a doubt that
it is competent for a state to authorize the erection of a bridge
across a navigable stream within its limits. But in all the cases
referred to, the power must be exercised subject to the restriction,
that the right of free navigation is not essentially impaired. If a
bridge is erected, it must be sufficiently elevated to admit of the
safe and convenient passage of such boats or vessels as are most
advantageously used for the conveyance of travellers or freight
upon the river or water course spanned by the bridge; or, if not
thus constructed, there must be a draw of such size and structure
as not materially to infringe the right of free and unobstructed
navigation.
It is however a question not clear of doubt, whether it is practi,cable to place a draw-bridge across a stream, subject to high floods,
and with a rapid curreit, as is the fact in reference to the Wabash,
without materially impairing its safe navigation. This description
,of bridge is obviously better suited to tide water streams or such as
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have little or no current, in reference to which, they may be used
with little hindrance to navigation.
The jury, however, in this case, may properly limit their inquiry
to the question whether the Terre Haute Bridge, with its draw of
the size and structure proved at the time and under the circumstances in which the injury to the plaintiffs' boat was sustained,
was an essential impediment to the navigation of the Wabash, and
this leads necessarily to the further inquiry, what constitutes such
an impediment?
Without going at length into the consideration of this question, it
may be stated that slight difficulties occasioning short stoppages, and
some loss of time, such as proceed from ferries, locks, dams, and even
bridges, as already intimated, are not to be viewed as material
obstructions. But, if these involve much loss of time in passing
them, or danger of accident or injury to life or property, or the use
of extraordinary caution, they do essentially impair the right of
free navigation, and subject those placing such obstructions in a
navigable stream, to damages for injuries which they occasion.
In reference to the Terre Haute Bridge, it will be proper for the
jury to give due weight to the evidence of .the witnesses, who have
had much experience in steamboat navigation on the Wabash, and
who say that in their judgment this bridge, especially in descending
the river, is a serious obstruction to navigation. There is also a
clear preponderance of proof to the effect that it is the more usual
practice in descending the river, to round to some distance above
the bridge, and thus by means of a rope made fast to the. shore, to
let the boat descend, stern foremost, slowly through the draw.
This process, as stated by some of the witnesses, occupies from ten
to thirty minutes; and by some, it is stated the detention is an
hour, and sometimes an hour and a half. The Court has no hesitation in saying, if the difficulties presented by this bridge are of'a
character requiring this precaution and this loss of time, it is a
material obstruction to navigation.
In the Wheeling Bridge case, before referred to, it appeared that
of the great number of steamers upon the Ohio river, there were
but seven which could not safely pass under the bridge at ordinary
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stages of water, without lowering their chimneys. These seven
boats could let down their chimneys, but the operation was
attended with .delay and some danger; or, they could navigate
the river, though -with less speed, with chimneys considerably
reduced in height; and yet, the Supreme Court of the United
States held, that the bridge was an essential impediment to
navigation-in fact, a public nuisance; and decreed that unless
so altered as not to impede the passage of any of the boats used on
the Ohio, it must be abated. This decision, emanating from the
highest Court of the Union, is obligatory on this Court, and must
be received as the law, so far as applicable to the present case.
Having reference to the principles here stated, it will be the duty
of the jury to pass .upon the question, whether from the evidence,
the Terre Haute Bridge is an impediment to the navigation of the
Wabash river. It is insisted by the counsel for the Bridge
Company, that the structure has been erected in compliance with
the charter granted by the State of Indiana, and that therefore,
the company are not liable for the injury complained of. The
charter, as before stated, authorizes the erection of the bridge, with
"a convenient draw." This clearly implies that it shall be such a
draw as may be used without vexatious delay or loss of time; and
also with safety to persons and property. Nothing less than this
will meet the requirement of the act of incorporation. And if the
jury find the charter has not been complied with, it cannot shield
the defendant from liability for the injury sustained by the plaintiff in passing the bridge. Or, if the jury come to the conclusion
from the evidence, that the bridge and draw are in accordance with
the charter, and yet a material obstruction to navigation, the
company are liable, if ordinary skill and care were used in navigating the plaintiffs' boat through the draw. For reasons already
stited, it was not competent for the Legislature of Indiana to
authorize a structure across the Wabash, which would be an essential hindrance to its navigation; and any law conferring such
authority, is a nullity.
It will therefore be a proper inquiry for the jury, whether the
plaintiffs' boat in passing the bridge, was managed with ordinary
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skill and caution. For, conceding the bridge to be an unlawful'
obstruction, yet if the plaintiffs' injury is clearly referable to the
reckless and unskilful management of their boat, the company are
not responsible for such injury. On this point, as on all others
involving the weight and credibility due to the witnesses, the jury
are the exclusive judges. If the evidence of the pilot, who was at
the wheel, and of others connected with the boat is entitled to
credit, the proof is satisfactory that the boat was managed with
skill and caution. She was not let down stern foremost by a rope,
as was the more usual way of passing the draw; nor is it regarded
as essential to the plaintiffs' right to recover for an injury sustained
in passing the draw, that such a precaution should have been used.
Some of the witnesses express the opinion that this is the safer
course, while others having skill and experience in the navigation
of the Wabash, say that neither prudence or safety requires it.
The pilot of the boat has testified very intelligently, and with
apparent candor, and says that he did not consider it necessary
to pass the draw stern foremost. He also says that great care and
caution were observed in passing through the draw, and that the
injury to the boat was not the result of either carelessness or want
of skill. He also says the boat would have passed safely through
the draw, but for a strong wind which suddenly struck her, and
caused her to veer from the course he was steering. In this statement the pilot is corroborated by several of the plaintiffs' witnesses,
while most of the witnesses for the defendant say they have no
recollection that there was any wind, exceeding a very moderate
breeze. This is not viewed as a material point in this case, as the
liability of the Bridge Company is in no way affected by the state
of the wind, or its influence in causing the collision. If the bridge
is an unlawful obstruction, and the plaintiffs used ordinary care and
skill in passing it, the company are responsible for the injury,
irrespective of the agency of the wind. And this for the obvious
reason that wind or no wind, the injury could not have been sustained, but for the fact that the bridge was there.
It is proper here to remark, in reference to the pilot of the plaintiffs' boat, that the evidence is satisfactory as to his professional
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character. He had served in that capacity for some years, on the
Wabash, and it is in proof that he is esteemed a safe, prudent and
skilful pilot. But notwithstanding this evidence of general good
professional reputation, if in this particular case he evinced recklessness and want of skill, and the injury to the plaintiffs' boat is
attributable to that cause, they must bear the consequences of his
misconduct.
In this case, a large proportion of the evidence for the plaintiffs
is in the form of depositions of persons who were on the boat at
the time of the accident, and of others experienced in the navigation of the Wabash, who have been examined as experts. These
depositions were taken at Cincinnati, without previous notice to the
opposite party, and without the attendance of his counsel. This
mode of taking testimony is expressly authorized by an Act of
Congress. It is liable to the objection that the opposite party is
precluded from the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses,
and thus testing the truthfulness of their statements. It is,
however, the right of the party against whom depositions thus
taken are to be used, to re-call and re-examine the same witnesses,
if he deems it necessary. The defendants in this case have not
availed themselves of this right; and-the plaintiffs' depositions are
therefore committed to the jury, as taken by tho other party,
without any cross-examination by the defendant. Under these
circumstances, it is ins isted by the defendant's counsel that these
depositions should be viewed with suspicion, and that they are
entitled to very little weight by the jury. On this point, it is only
necessary to remark, that these depositions are by law admissible
to the jury as evidence; and, although they would be entitled to
greater weight if taken upon notice to the other party, and with an
opportunity for cross-examination, they are, nevertheless, entitled to
credit, unless otherwise impeached. It is, however, for the jury to
give them such consideration as they may deserve.
It has been before noticed that a part of the evidence for the
plaintiffs iii this case, consists in the opinions of experts-those
experienced in and familiar with the navigation of the Wabash-as
to the practical effect of the Terre Haute Bridge upon the navi-
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gableness of that river, and the correctness of the professional conduct of those entrusted with the management of the plaintiffs' boat
in passing the bridge. In reference to this description of evidence,
it is only necessary to remark that for the obvious reason that those
best acquainted with any particular art, profession or business, in
all matters directly concerning them, are accounted more satisfactory
and reliable witnesses than those who have no such skill or experience. Hence it is well settled, that the testimony of intelligent
and credible experts is entitled to the most respectful consideration.
The principle here stated, applies as well to navigation as to any
other art or occupation.
It only remains for the Court to say, that if the jury find the
plaintiffs are entitled to their verdict, the amount of damages to be
awarded is wholly with them. The actual expenses of repairing the
injury sustained by the plaintiffs' boat forms, of course, an element
in estimating the amount. But it is, moreover, proper to bring to
to the notice of the jury, a late decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States,' having a direct bearing on the question of
damages in this case. That Court has held, that in an action for
an injury by collision with another boat, the boat of the plaintiff
not being in" fault, he was entitled to compensation, in damages, for
the profits his boat would have made during the time necessarily
lost in repairing the injury sustained. No reason is perceived why
the same principle does not apply to the present case. If, therefore,
the jury find for the plaintiffs, they should include in their verdict,
the amount of the probable earnings of the plaintiffs' boat during
the time she was delayed in making the repairs necessary to refit
her for service. This amount will be settled by the evidence before
the jury, on that point.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, assessing their
damages at $1,000. A motion for a new trial by the defendants
was overruled.
'The case referred to is that of rilliamsonand others vs. Barrett and others, 13
How. S. 0. Rep., 101. The same principle was decided in this case by the Circuit
Court of Ohio, 4 McLean, '589.

PROUTY vs. HUDSON.

In the IDiatrict Court of Philadelphia-Sept.,1854.
PROUTY VS. HUDSON.
1. As a general rule, debts sued for and intended to be set off, must be mutual
and due in the same right.
2. Where a judgment has been obtained against executors individually, they cannot set off this judgment against one obtained by their decedent in his life-time
against their judgment creditor, because the claims are not between the same parties nor in the same rights.

Rule. to set off judgment.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
SUARSWOOD, P. J.-The defendants- have produced the evidence that they are the executors of Brown, and show a judgment in favor of Brown against the plaintiff, which they ask to
set off against the idgment in this case. The judgment in this
case was obtained against them individually, in an action of trover.
The set-off of .one judgment against another, is not within the
statute of set-off. It is a practice which has long prevailed in the
courts of this State as well as England, to allow such set-off upon the
equitable principle that in conscience and morality all that the party
really owes is the balance. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, while
not absolutely bound to allow set off in all cases in which it would be
allowable under the statute, the Court however have adopted the
rules established in the construction of the statute. More especially
the rule that the claims asked to be set off, should be between the
same parties and in the same right, has received the unequivocal
sanction of the courts here as well as elsewhere, ia regard to the
set-off of judgments. Best vs. Lawson, 1 Miles, 11; Dunkin vs.
Calbraith, 1 Brown, 47; Mason vs. XEnoulson, 1 Hill, 215.
It seems to be well settled in England, that a defendint sued for
his own debt, cannot set off a debt due to him as executor or
administrator, because debts sued for and intended to be set off, must
be mutual and due in the same right. 1 Tidd's Practice, 718; 2
Williams on Ex'rs, 1,200. The last named writer cites Bishop vs.
Church, 3 Atkins, 691; Gale vs. Suttler, 1 Young & Jervis, 180.
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'There is one American case which is to the same point. ' Thomas vs. Hopper, 5 Alabama R. 442. Although there is no case
in Pennsylvania dxpressly to the very point, yet Hfalliday vs.
Bissey, 2 Jones, 347, was decided upon, a distinction altogether
unnecessary, if the rule be not the same here. It was there held
that when the debt arose upon a contract made with the executor,
though acting in his character as such, he was entitled to make it
the subject of a set-off in a suit against him for his own debt.
There seems to be good reason for the rule. It would be to allow
the executor to pay his own debt with the assets of the estate. If
such payment were made inpais,the creditor receivring the payment,
with knowledge of the circumstances, would be liable to those beneficially interested in the estate. Can it be equitable to compel the
plaintiff to accept in part payment what he may be called on hereafter to pay again or expend, if the executors should prove to be
insolvent? Or if the judgment of the Court would protect him, is
it equitable to preclude the creditors and legatees from their right
to question the validity of the transaction, and follow the assets of
the estates into the hands of a party unequivocally cognizant of
their misapplication? What a wide door is open to fraud and
collusion under the sanction of a Court of justice, by adopting
either horn of this dilemma.
-It is said that upon the allowance of the set-off, the defendants
would be chargeable with the amount in their account as executors,
and a doubtful debt might be thus saved to the estate. The same
reason would hold in allowing payment or transfer of assets in paisthe executor might sell and put the money in his pocket, and it
comes at last to his personal responsibility. But it does not so come
in all cases. There are some guards which the law has placed
against the misapplication of trust funds, which it is quite important
to the interest of cestuique trusts, often helpless women and children,
should be carefully preserved.
Rule discharged.
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PASSMORE'S ADM'R UNDER WILL OF HENRY ETTER.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
APPEAL BY LEAH PASSMORE'S ADMINISTRATOR IN THE DISTRIBUTION
UNDER THE WILL OF HENRY ETTER, SR.

1. When a devise or bequest is ambiguously expressed, it is always important to
bear in mind the inclination which the law has in favor of the heirs, which, with
us, is a rule of equality, and also in favor of a Testing of the estate at the death
of the testator, or at the earliest possible period thereafter, and jlso in favor ef
an absolute, and against a defeasible estate.
2. It is under the influence of this bias, that words of survi'orship are generally referred to at death of the testator, if there be nothing indicating a contrary intentionf.
3. Where land was devised to a son for life, with the provision that at his death,
without issue living, it "shall revert to my estate, and shall be sold by my executors, and the proceeds thereof distributed among my surviving heirs hereia
named, agreeably to the intestate laws of Pennsylvania." Held, that this create!
a vested remainder in the devisees and legatees living at the death of the testator,
subject to be devested on the son's dying, leaving issue, and that the share of one
of the devisees ;who died before the termination of a precedent estate, passed 4
her legal representatives.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LowRE, J.-The estate which the testator had granted to his
son Henry, having terminated, the question now arises what disposition he intended should be made of the reversion. He says it
"shall revert to my estate, and shall be sold by my executors, and
the proceeds thereof distributed among my surviving heirs herein
named, agreeably to the intestate laws of Pennsylvania," and this
is the provision that is to be interpreted.
In other parts of his will he provides for his living children, and
for the children of those that were dead. In relation to the clause
in question, it is very apparent that he does not use the word " revert" in the strict legal sense; for he certainly meafis to exclude
Henry from having any share in the reversion. In other words,
the estate which the devisees or legetees take, is not by way of reversion, but as a gift of the reversion. It is intended for only some
of his heirs, and is therefore only a remainder. For the same reason he does not use the word heirs, as correctly indicating their re-
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lation to him, but descriptively, meaning his children .and grandchildren.
The trouble is to ascertain what he means by his "surviving
heirs herein named," and it arises from the fact that his daughter
Leah died without issue, before her brother Henry's estate terminated. Was she surviving heir of her father within the meaning
of his will? If, when he wrote it, he was thinking of his children
and grand-children who had already died, or who might die before
he did, then she was. He does not describe those who are to take
after Henry's death, as those who shall be then surviving heirs, nor
as the survivors of his devisees, but his surviving heirs who are
herein named; which grammatically refers to the present time, that
of making the will. And such also would be the most natural construction of a gift of the reversion to be divided "agreeably to the
intestate laws."
But the case presents itself in other aspects. The estate granted
to Henry was in terms a life estate, with remainder to his unborn
issue, "if such he shall have to survive him." Now, if we treat
this as an estate tail, the clause we are especially considering gives
a vested remainder in the other devisees. If it was only a life
estate, with a contingent remainder in favor of his unborn children,
then there was a vested remainder in the other devisees, subject to
be defeated by the death of Henry leaving issue living. In either
way, therefore, the other devisees or legatees had a vested estate at
the moment of the testator's death. 8 Madd. 410, 2 State Rep.
69; 1 Baldw. 174; 2 Keene, 284; 7 W. & S. 279. This view is
very important, for it gives to the devisees an estate independently
of the directions concerning distribution, and makes those directions
merely the means of placing them in the enjoyment of it. And if
we give the fullest meaning that is allowed here, to his word "revert," we arrive at the same result; for as a reversion, it must vest
in them immediately on the taking effect of the temporary estate of
Henry, that is, on the testator's death.
When a devise or bequest is ambiguously expressed, it is always
important to bear in mind the inclination which the law has in favor
of the heirs, which, in' Pennsylvania, is a rule of equality, and also
in favor of a vesting of the estate at the death of the testator, or
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as early as possible thereafter, and also in favor of an absolute, and
against a defeasible estate. All these principles are of use here.
It is in perfect accordance with them, and under their influence,
that it has so often. been decided that the word survivors shall be
referred to the death of the testator, if there is nothing indicating a
contrary intention. It favors, in this instance, equality among his
heirs or devisees, and we see no word tending to show that he meant
to place Leah on a different footing from the others. He makes no
provision in defeasance of her estate in any event, but, on the contrary, he seems to say that it shall go to her as an heir, agreeably
to the intestate laws. It requires clear expressions or implications
to devest her vested estate.
We are therefore of opinion that when he provided that the remainder should go to his "surviving" heirs, he meant, as testators
very often mean by that word, his "other" heirs, or rather devisees
and legatees. And when he said "agreeable to the intestate laws,"
he added a confirmation to this view.
It is not necessary to allude to the sale of the land, except to say
that it could not be sold as Henry's after it, fell back to the estate,
and that the sale was proper then, only u-Ader the power given to
sell and distribute according to the clause principally discusDecree accordingly.
In the Curt of nrrors of MXi8ssi2pi.
HATCH W
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1. The principle is well established, that every common trespass is not a foundation
for an injunction, where it is only contingent and temporary; but if it continue so
long as to become a nuisance, the Court will interfere and grant an injunction.

2. The rule is laid down that, in order to give jurisdiction, there must be such an
injury, as from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately compensated by
damages at law, or such as, from its continuance or permanent mischief, must
occasion a constantly recurring grievance.
3. A private individual may obtain an injunction to prevent a public mischief, by

which he is affected in common with others.

On appeal from the Northern District Chancery Court at Fulton:
Hon. Henry Dickinson, Vice-Chancellor.
IWe are indebted to the civility of the Reporter for the sheets of his forthcoming

volume.

This case is reported in 4 Cush., 84.
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The facts are substantially stated in the opinion of the Court, by
Mr. Justice HANDY.-This was a bill filed in the District Chancery Court at Fulton, by the appellee, against the appellant, to
enjoin him from the erection of a mill-dam. The bill alleges, in
substance, that the complainant's lands, which lay in the vicinity of
the mill-dam about to be made, would be inundated by the construction of it, so that their value would be greatly lessened and
much of the timber killed, by the damning up of the water; and
that the health of the neighborhood would be greatly injured by the
stagnation of the water produced by the dam. The answer denies
the material allegations of the bill, and much testimony was taken
on both sides. The Vice-Chancellor directed the following issues
to be tried in the Circuit Court of Monroe County, where the
matter complained f was located. 1. Whether the mill-dam Aould
operate a private nuisance to the complainant. 2. Whether or not
it would operate a public nuisance to the neighborhood in which it
was to be erected.
And on the trial in the Circuit Court the jury found a verdict
that it would operate as a public nuisance; upon the return of
which verdict to the Vice-Chancery Court, a perpetual injunction
was decreed; and hence the case is brought to this Court.
1. It is insisted, in the first place, on the part of the appellant,
that the complainant was not entitled to relief in equity on the
ground of the private nuisance; because relief in equity will only
be granted.in such cases where the mischief is irreparable and cannot be compensated in damages. Authorities are to be found holding this doctrine; but the modern and more approved cases extend
the relief in equity much further, upon the just principle of interposing to prevent the evil, rather than to compensate for it after it
has been committed. Thus it is held to apply to cases of diversion
of watercourses, or pulling down banks, and exposing the complainant to inundation. Eden on Injunc. 269; 1 Bro. C. C. 588; 10
Ves. 194. In Coulson vs. WMte, 3 Atk. 81, Lord Hardwick said,
"Every common trespass is not a foundation for an injunction,
where it is only contingent and temporary; but if it continues so
long as to become a nuisance, the Court interferes, and will grant
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an injunction." Judge Story lays down the :ule thus: in order to
give the jurisdiction, he says, "there must be such an injury as
from its nature is not susceptible of being adequately, compensated
by damages at law, or such as, from its continuance or permanent
mischief, must occasion a constantly recurring grievance, which cannot be otherwise prevented but by an injunction." 2 Story Eq.
Jur. § 925.
These principles fully justify the relief sought in this case. The
inundations occasioned by the erection of the dam, the injuries
thereby caused to the complainant's lands, and the periodical
destruction of his timber, did not constitute a single trespass, but,
from their nature, must have been "1constantly recurring grievances." It would have been unreasonable and oppressive to force
the complainant into a court of law to redresi each repetition of
the injury as it might recur from time to time; and therefore, on
the very principle of "suppressing interminable litigation," and of
"preventing multiplicity of suits," courts of equity alone can give
just and adequate relief in such cases.
2. The appellant urges that the complainant was not entitled to
an injunction on the ground of a public nuisance, because a private
individual cannot come into a Court of Equity for relief from a
public nuisance, unless he avers and proves some special injury;
and that ,there is no such averment in this case. He contends, that
the proper mode of proceeding is by indictment at law, or by information in equity, at the suit of the Attorney-General or the State.
We do not think these positions well founded.
An indictment could only result in an abatement of the nuisance
after it had been committed. It could not prevent the mischief
arising from it before the indictment could be tried and the judgment
carried into execution. That remedy would, therefore, be inadequate.
As to the right of the complainant to seek the relief, the bill
states, that the health of the neighborhood would be greatly injured
by the stagnation of water produced by the dam, and it shows that
the complainant's lands lay within a short distance of it, and would
be affected by it. His property, therefore, as a place of residence,

